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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of methods employed to quantify non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) and then analyses their differences and looks at what these mean for the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. We find several similarities in the 
approaches taken. Because all studies conclude that NTMs matter, policy-makers are right to 
focus on ‘regulatory cooperation’ in TTIP. Given the significant differences in NTMs across 
sectors, policy-makers should dive deep into sector-specific elements of NTMs and focus on 
those sectors where the largest potential gains can be made (i.e. where NTMs are highest, such 
as in agriculture, automobiles, steel, textiles and insurance services). An area identified for 
further research is the fact that unlike trade taxes (i.e. tariffs), regulatory barriers to trade are 
not generally targeted as the primary policy objective, but rather stem from other strategic 
policy concerns such as consumer safety and/or social and environmental protection. This 
element should be further investigated. 
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Quantifying Non-Tariff Measures 
for TTIP 
Koen Berden and Joseph Francois* 
Paper No. 12 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ 
and CEPS Special Report No. 116 / July 2015 
1. Introduction 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is not just like any other free trade 
agreement negotiated or signed into existence (Fontagné et al., 2013; Berden et al., 2009). The 
communicated objectives of TTIP make it clear that its goals include but go beyond traditional 
market-access elements such as goods and services trade and customs duties, and rules. TTIP 
is envisaged to especially focus on the areas of ‘regulatory cooperation’ and ‘rules’.  
Traditional economic (ex-ante) impact analyses used to focus on tariffs, quotas and subsidies 
(and increasingly also barriers to services trade) as the main trade policy instruments. With an 
enlarged scope of trade agreements like TTIP that include regulatory cooperation, these 
analyses were no longer sufficient to estimate the potential impact of TTIP – or any TTIP-like 
agreement. The main challenge that needed to be addressed in order to be able to quantify the 
potential economic effects was how to quantify economically the area of regulatory 
differences – in this case between the European Union and United States.1 
Several studies have looked at the potential economic effects of TTIP, ranging from Berden et 
al. (2009) to Fontagné et al. (2013), Francois et al. (2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2013). These 
studies have been compared by Pelkmans et al. (2014) in their comparative work for the 
European Parliament. All of these studies focus on the likely macroeconomic and sectoral 
impacts of TTIP. For that they take as input for their methodological approaches different ways 
to quantify economically regulatory differences, or non-tariff measures (NTMs), as they are 
also called. NTMs – as opposed to non-tariff barriers (NTBs) – are compatible with the WTO 
charter. The term NTM is therefore often used as the collective name for regulatory differences 
or barriers that include technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) 
measures. 
In this paper, we will first identify the methods that have been employed to quantify NTMs 
(section 2). We then compare some of the most important methods and analyse their 
differences and look at what they mean for the TTIP negotiations (section 3). We start with a 
short literature review of past approaches to measuring the costs of non-tariff measures. We 
then look in more detail at four seminal studies to quantify NTMs over the past several years: 
Dean et al. (2009), Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013) and Egger et al. (2015). These four 
                                                     
* Koen Berden is Chief Economist and Senior Partner at Ecorys, Assistant Professor at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, and Associate at the World Trade Institute. Joseph Francois is Professor of 
International Economics at the University of Bern and Managing Director of the World Trade Institute. 
1 The comprehensive approach to include regulatory cooperation and rules in trade agreements has first 
been used in the EU-Canada CETA negotiations and is currently also used by the EU – in parallel with 
the TTIP negotiations – in the EU-Japan FTA negotiations and the negotiations over the renewal of the 
EU-Mexico FTA. 
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studies contain cornerstone elements on how to approach NTMs – and these studies thus serve 
as the basis for most of the quantitative research into the realm of ‘regulatory cooperation’. 
We find several similarities in the approaches taken. For example, all studies find that trade 
costs caused by NTMs matter significantly and significantly more than remaining tariff 
barriers. Also the studies find significant variation of NTMs across sectors and a few sectors 
where NTMs are particularly high (e.g. processed foods). Differences between the approaches 
(and thus in results) come from a difference in basic approach (i.e. price- or quantity-based), 
differences in the data sources used for NTMs (e.g. business survey, UNCTAD TRAINS, past 
FTA data), econometric specifications (e.g. general equilibrium versus partial equilibrium), 
and levels of country and sector disaggregation and coverage.  
Because all studies conclude that NTMs matter, policy-makers are right to focus on ‘regulatory 
cooperation’ in TTIP. Given the significant differences in NTMs across sectors, policy-makers 
should dive deep into sector-specific elements of NTMs and focus on those sectors where the 
largest potential gains can be made (i.e. where NTMs are highest, such as in agriculture, 
automobiles, steel, textiles and insurance services).  
An area identified for further research is the fact that unlike trade taxes (i.e. tariffs), regulatory 
barriers to trade are not generally targeted at trade as the primary policy objective, but rather 
stem from other strategic policy concerns like consumer safety and/or social and 
environmental protection. This element should be further investigated. 
2. Review of NTM quantification methods 
In the past 20 years, we have witnessed two important trends regarding both multilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements. The first is a relative shift in focus of trade negotiations from tariff 
reductions to the removal of NTMs. For surveys of earlier work, see Deardorff & Stern (1998) 
and Ferrantino (2006). The second is an increase in the depth of trade agreements being 
negotiated (see for example Dür et al., 2014, and Egger et al., 2015). Because of these shifts, the 
importance of quantifying the impact of NTMs has increased significantly over the past 10 
years, and more research into this specific field has been carried out.  
There are two basic avenues one can follow in order to estimate in a systematic way the 
economic and trade effects of NTMs: quantity- and price-based approaches. Quantity-based 
approaches (or actually value-based approaches as indicated by Ferrantino, 2009) use gravity 
equations to estimate by how much the presence of an NTM reduces trade flows compared to 
potential trade. This allows for the estimation of an ad valorem equivalent (AVE) or trade cost 
equivalent (TCE), essentially a ‘fictitious’ import tariff, that – if real – would reduce imports 
by exactly the height of the NTM. Earlier work was done by Baldwin (1975), and Bhagwati & 
Srinivasan (1975), but also others have since looked at this: Leamer (1988), Trefler (1993), Kee 
et al. (2008, 2009), Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013), Francois et al. (2013) and Egger 
et al. (2015). The approaches based on price compare the prices in the importing country with 
prices of comparable products in free markets, i.e. without distortions. Using detailed price 
data, a distinction can be made between the impact of NTMs and the impact of local 
distribution costs in raising the price. Through an instrumental variables approach to 
incorporate the endogeneity of NTMs, the height of NTMs can be estimated. The ‘price gap’ 
or tariff equivalent is then the difference between the price of imports (higher because of the 
NTM) and the lower world price (in the absence of the NTM). Among those using a price-
based approach are Bradford (2003, 2005), Ferrantino (2006), and Dean et al. (2009).  
QUANTIFYING NON-TARIFF MEASURES FOR TTIP | 3 
 
The debate between those proposing price-based approaches (Ferrantino, 2006; Dean et al., 
2009) and those favouring quantity-based approaches (Fontagné et al., 2013) is ongoing. 
According to Ferrantino (2006, p. 20 and Annex 2): “There are several reasons for preferring 
price gaps to quantity gaps in most cases. First, price gaps measure the difference between two 
observed values, a distorted (NTM-ridden) price and a non-distorted price. Quantity or value 
gaps measure the difference between an observed (distorted) value and an estimated 
(‘normal’) value of trade, and are thus influenced by the quality of the estimated value, which 
is subject to the various uncertainties surrounding econometric specifications.” Fontagné et al. 
(2013), on the other hand, argue that although price-based approaches allow for a direct 
estimation of NTMs – in contrast to the more indirect quantity-based approaches – “largely 
due to data issues, quantity-based approaches prove more convenient for large-scale analyses 
such as the one [eds: economic impact assessment of TTIP] conducted here” (Fontagné et al., 
2013, p. 8). 
Apart from a methodological discussion between price- and quantity-based approaches, we 
need to be careful here for another reason: unlike trade taxes, regulatory barriers to trade are 
not generally targeted at trade as the primary policy objective. Rather, we are talking about 
regulatory approaches to issues such as consumer safety, the stability of financial markets, and 
environmental protection from – for example – dangerous chemicals. In this case, higher costs 
(identified by regressions, for example) most certainly reflect the balance between costs of 
regulation (including trade costs) and benefits linked to the primary policy objective. This 
point, while acknowledged in passing, is not given full due in quantitative analyses of NTM 
reductions. Where consumers (aka voters) in the US and EU place different values on such 
objectives, we need to be careful not to assume that identified barriers are not offset by benefits. 
Tariff equivalents/Trade cost equivalents (TCEs) 
Despite the methodological debate on the differences between price- and quantity-based 
approaches, authors from either strand agree that the ultimate goal of the quantification 
exercise is to yield tariff equivalents (or synonymously, ad valorem equivalents or trade cost 
equivalents). A TCE is in essence the aggregate height of the differences in regulatory systems 
expressed in one number: a ‘tariff equivalent’. Expressing the total of differences in regulatory 
systems (estimated through either price- or quantity-based approaches) as one number has 
several major advantages. First of all, a tariff equivalent makes it conceptually much easier for 
readers to get a ballpark idea of the degree of regulatory divergence between the EU and US 
in a specific sector, i.e. for US exports to the EU, the difference in regulations adds up to a 26% 
TCE in the automotive industry. Second, tariff equivalents make it easy to compare tariff rates 
and regulatory differences (expressed in tariff equivalents). Third, a tariff equivalent can be 
compared across sectors, as the measuring unit is the same, i.e. for EU exports to the US, a 73% 
difference in the food sector is much higher than a 21% difference in the chemicals sector. 
Fourth, the removal of regulatory differences, i.e. liberalisation scenarios that are used to 
estimate the consequence of TTIP through regulatory cooperation, can be modelled by 
lowering tariff equivalents in a sector (or multiple sectors) in a partial or general equilibrium 
setting. This ‘lowering of TCEs’ represents any form of regulatory cooperation to address 
regulatory differences.2 Please note that this implies that a lowering of a TCE implies a 
                                                     
2 In this paper we look at the econometric techniques of quantifying the economic costs and benefits of 
NTMs, not at the different ways in which regulatory alignment can be achieved. Whether it is better to 
aim for harmonisation of standards, harmonisation of regulations, mutual recognition of standards, 
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lowering of NTMs, which is lowering of the differences between regulatory systems, not 
lowering the levels of protection or lowering of standards (which goes back to our earlier point 
on consumer and environmental protection). Fifth, a TCE – being a numerical value – can be 
inserted into an international trade or macro-economic model to look at the effects of 
regulatory cooperation on GDP, firm production, consumer prices, wages, jobs, etc., as has 
been done by Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013), Francois et al. (2013) and Felbermayr 
et al. (2013). 
In order to do justice to both strands of work to quantify NTMs in the remainder of this section, 
we will cover four different studies: the price-based NTM estimation work of Dean et al. (2009) 
and the quantity-based NTM estimation work of Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013) 
and Egger et al. (2014). It needs to be noted that Dean et al. (2009) do not focus on measuring 
the potential economic impact of TTIP in particular, while the other three studies aim to do 
that – and as such some model specifications are different (e.g. sector selection). 
While we have stressed, in the discussion so far, regulatory cooperation and reduction of 
differences, it is not so clear that econometric, or even price comparison approaches, actually 
allow full separation of simple differences in approaching the same objective from and 
associated dead weight costs to differences reflecting social value placed on the underlying 
regulations, differences and associated costs notwithstanding. We discuss this point further 
when we turn to the concept of actionability. At this point though, we wish to stress the risk 
that we, as economists, may focus too much here on cost and not enough on the benefit side 
of regulations that happen to have trade and investment effects. 
2.1 The Dean et al. (2009) NTM quantification methodology (price-based) 
Dean et al. (2009) employ a price-based approach. This means they use city-level retail price 
data to estimate the impact of core NTMs on prices and assess their significance. In doing so 
they base themselves on Bradford (2003, 2005) for price data for many products in many 
countries, and on Kee et al. (2008, 2009) for NTM incidence data. They go through four distinct 
steps in their price-based approach. 
The four-step approach: 
I. NTM incidence and retail price data 
II. Price gap 
III. Variable coefficients 
IV. From variable coefficients to sector-specific TCEs 
I. NTM incidence and retail price data 
Dean et al. (2009) needed to collect two types of data for their analysis. First, in order to get a 
better understanding of the extent and types of NTMs across countries and products, they 
draw upon two complementary datasets: the UNCTAD TRAINS database and the USITC 
database (Donelly & Manifold, 2005). These data bases document EU (from the EU Market 
Access Database) and US (USTR National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers – 
which includes information from the WTO Trade Policy Reviews) private-sector complaints 
                                                     
mutual recognition of regulations or mutual equivalence is outside the scope of this paper. This is 
covered in Pelkmans & Egan (forthcoming 2015).  
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about NTMs. The UNCTAD TRAINS database (including WITS) collects data from publicly 
available sources and reports in detail at the tariff line level. The authors used the potentially 
complementary information from the two databases, while at the same time there was overlap 
in the reported NTMs.3 This is why Dean et al. compare the two datasets and conclude that 
NTMs appear to be widespread, and the two databases partially overlap but also provide 
specific independent information. This is why they used the two databases combined. 
In addition to the NTM incidence, Dean et al. (2009) required extensive amounts of price data 
in order to carry out a ‘price gap’ analysis. They used city-level retail price data for 47 products 
from around 115 cities from the EIU CityData for 2001. This allowed the authors to examine 
inter- and intra-country price differences, some of which can be attributed to NTMs. They 
found that price differences are both product- and country-specific – again an indication for 
the widespread nature of NTMs. 
II. Price gap 
Dean et al. (2009) also employed the data from Step I in a differentiated product model. This 
model takes into account different varieties, in particular a distinction between imported and 
domestic varieties. This approach matters because a big challenge for the price-based approach 
is product differentiation: “The model captures the fact that the retail price in a particular 
location will likely be an average of the retail prices of all the imported and domestic varieties 
sold locally, and that these products are likely to be differentiated by source” (Dean et al., 2009, 
p. 4).  
Then, using the EIU CityData for 2001, they observe price differences – in deviation from 
purchasing power parity (PPP). This they define as the Price Gap or ‘PG’ – the dependent 
variable. 
III. Variable coefficients 
In order to capture the NTM effect (NTM rent of country i, Qi), the retail price gap between the 
home country and foreign country (𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑖∗) is regressed on local distribution margins (μ), 
transport costs (D), and specific tariffs (T). The authors also correct for endogeneity of NTMs 
by adding two interaction terms – one with country income and one with tariffs. This is 
depicted in equation (1) as: 
𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽(𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖∗) − 𝛾(𝐷𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖∗) − 𝛿(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖∗) + 𝜎0(𝑄𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖∗) + 𝜎1(𝑄𝑖?̃?𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖∗?̃?𝑖∗) + 𝜎2(𝑄𝑖?̃?𝑖 −
𝑄𝑖∗?̃?𝑖∗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑖∗  (1) 
where 𝜎0 is the average price premium due to NTMs. This is the coefficient that is the core of 
the paper: a regression analysis coefficient to single out the additional price effect of NTMs by 
country and sector. If this coefficient is statistically significant and positive, we can conclude 
that the NTM effect is one that increases the price gap. The coefficient information is presented 
in column (A) of Table 1 below. Dean et al. (2009) do this for 65 countries. In Table 1, we only 
report findings for the EU and US – as this chapter focuses on the quantification of NTMs in 
the area of TTIP, hence on the EU and US. 
                                                     
3 TRAINS is likely to be more comprehensive and detailed, but the ITC database helps to understand 
whether some of the TRAINS NTMs are actually binding or not. TRAINS in turn complements the ITC 
database in reporting NTM complaints that come from third countries.  
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IV. From variable coefficients to country-specific, sector-specific TCEs 
Step III above (Variable Coefficients) yields country-specific, sector-specific regression 
coefficients for the NTM effect. The variable coefficient of the NTM effect can be changed into 
trade cost estimates (tariff equivalents) as follows: 
 TCE = 100 𝑥 (𝑒𝜀 − 1) (2) 
where ε is the NTM effect regression coefficient. The TCE (in percent) is the estimated increase 
in prices in a country, per sector, as a consequence of NTMs. This information is presented in 
column (B) of Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Country estimates NTM coefficients and NTM TCEs  
Country and sector NTM effect regression 
coefficients 
(A) 
NTM TCEs (%) 
(B) 
EU (average 18 EU member states)   
- Fruits/vegetables   48.2 
- Bovine meat  68.2 
- Processed food  35.6 
- Apparel  46.3 
United States   
- Fruits/vegetables  0.47 60.6 
- Bovine meat 0.59 80.0 
- Processed food 0.30 34.6 
- Apparel 0.20 22.6 
Source: Dean et al. (2009). 
Final results 
The Dean et al. (2009) study leads to some interesting findings. First, they find for 65 countries 
and four sectors TCEs through direct NTM price-based estimation (above we report only for 
the EU and US because these NTMs are relevant for the TTIP negotiations). Second, they find 
that NTMs complement tariffs – in some sectors the presence of a tariff reduces the price effect 
of the NTM. Third, in some sectors there is a correlation between the restrictiveness of NTMs 
with country income (some positive, some negative).4 Fourth, the level of NTMs displays some 
significant sector- and country-variation. Finally, they find that NTMs matter significantly in 
explaining trade restrictiveness in the sectors examined. 
2.2 The Berden et al. (2009) NTM quantification methodology (quantity-
based) 
In order to quantify NTMs, the Berden et al. (2009) study develops five distinct steps in line 
with the quantity-based approaches to quantifying NTMs. This basic quantification work has 
                                                     
4 It seems logical to us that, where regulatory barriers reflect income sensitive demand for higher 
consumer protection (as in food products and consumer goods), we would see such a positive 
correlation. 
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been used to quantify the potential effects of TTIP (combined with CGE analysis) by Berden et 
al. (2009), Francois et al. (2013), and Capaldo (2014). The five steps take the reader from grass-
roots views on regulatory divergences by firms that do business across the Atlantic to an 
estimate of trade cost equivalents (TCE) involved for EU-US and US-EU trade at sectoral level.  
The five-step approach: 
The five steps to go from survey results on transatlantic regulatory barriers to TCE are the 
following: 
I. Business survey to get bilateral NTM survey numbers 
II. From NTM survey numbers to NTM index 
III. From NTM index to gravity regression variable coefficient 
IV. From variable coefficient to transatlantic, EU and NAFTA3 TCEs 
V. From transatlantic, EU and NAFTA TCEs to sector specific TCEs 
I. Business survey to get bilateral NTM survey numbers 
Is it more difficult to trade between France and the US for a French exporter than to trade 
between France and Spain? Or between Poland and Italy, Poland and India and Poland and 
the US? Or for a US exporter to export to Mexico or to Germany? In light of the definition of 
an NTM, the costs for a French producer to produce and sell inside France are not zero, because 
regulatory differences, e.g. to protect food safety or the safety of a car we drive in, lead to 
various costs.  
The business survey then collected two types of data. First, firms were asked to indicate on a 
scale from 0 to 100 how restrictive each of their export markets was (compared to their home 
market as a benchmark).4 The 5,500 data points from both large firms and SMEs that were the 
result of this survey allowed Berden et al. to generate exporter-importer specific survey 
numbers of NTMs with a country-pair specific NTM variable between 0 and 100. These survey 
numbers were – for statistical reasons – then aggregated into specific exporter destination 
NTM values, averaging the indicated NTM for each country. This information is presented in 
column (A) of Table 2. Second, firms were asked to list the main (sector-specific) barriers that 
they ran into when exporting. The lists of barriers were prioritised based on the firm survey 
responses, discussions with (sector) experts and literature information. The lists of barriers 
were also used to look at whether barriers involved economic rents and/or costs and the 
degree to which each of the barriers would be ‘actionable’ or not. The concept of actionability 
contains the sub-concepts of ‘technical actionability’ and ‘political actionability’. For example, 
the electricity systems in the EU and US differ (220 volts a.c. vs. 110 volts) – which would 
require such an investment that this difference is deemed ‘technically non-actionable’. In some 
sectors, e.g. aerospace, national security concerns imply that some regulatory differences are 
‘politically non-actionable’.  
The additional survey information on costs-rents and on actionability are significant, because 
this information allows us to be more accurate in our estimations: they reduce the scope for 
                                                     
3 NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement. 
4 Whereby a value of ‘0’ presents a completely open and ‘free trade’ environment and a value of ‘100’ a 
completely closed environment. A scale from 0 to 100 was chosen to allow for enough variation in the 
survey responses.   
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TTIP impact to only those regulatory differences that can logically be addressed, i.e. are 
‘actionable’. And they give a better insight into the redistribution effects of TTIP from 
producers to consumers or vice versa (redistribution of economic rents) and the cost effects of 
TTIP (costs). Both the degrees of actionability and costs-rents differ per sector and for EU 
exports to the US and US exports to the EU (bi-directional).  
II. From NTM survey numbers to NTM index 
The NTM survey numbers (Step I) are transformed into an NTM index in log scale conforming 
to OECD best practice:  
 Trade/investment level of restrictiveness = ln (1 + 0.01 * NTM survey value) (3) 
This is done so that the coefficients on the index can be interpreted as elasticities with respect 
to changes in the level of restriction across the index. Shifting the origin is done to handle zero 
values in the original data. This information is presented in column (B) of Table 2. 
III. From NTM index to gravity regression dummy-variable coefficients 
The way to measure the impact of trade agreements, in this case TTIP, on trade and investment 
is through employing the gravity equation (Tinbergen, 1962; Linneman, 1966; Aitken, 1973). 
The gravity equation derives its name from Newton’s law of gravitation. In international trade 
this has come to mean that the trade flow of goods (services) from one country to the other is 
related to the economic sizes of the two countries and the physical distance between them. In 
addition various control variables are added, e.g. dummies for sharing a common border or 
speaking a common language, as are policy-based trade costs, e.g. tariffs, or NTMs. The gravity 
equation has a remarkable explanatory power and as such has become the work horse in 
looking at the impact of trade agreements (Sapir, 1981; Bergstrand & Egger, 2007; Berden et 
al., 2009). In Berden et al., three different dummies have been defined to capture the potential 
effect of the TTIP agreement. These three dummies – when interacted with the NTM index 
constructed in Step II – capture effects that, when added up, yield the total effect of NTM 
reductions because of TTIP. First an EU dummy is defined that has a value ‘1’ if both countries 
in the bilateral trade pair are members of the EU and ‘0’ if otherwise. This dummy captures 
the intra-EU preferential treatment given to other EU members compared to external partners. 
This means that a reduction in non-EU NTMs, e.g. EU-US through TTIP, will make the US 
more and other EU members relatively less attractive and thus divert trade and investment 
away from European partners to – for example, in the case of TTIP – the US. Second, a NAFTA 
dummy is constructed that has a value ‘1’ if both countries in the bilateral trade pair are 
members of NAFTA and ‘0’ if otherwise. As with the EU, this dummy captures the intra-
NAFTA preferential treatment given to other NAFTA members compared to external 
partners. This means that a reduction in non-NAFTA NTMs, e.g. EU-US through TTIP, will 
make the EU more and other NAFTA members relatively less attractive and thus divert trade 
and investment away from NAFTA partners to – for example, in the case of TTIP – the EU. 
Finally, the authors define a transatlantic dummy, i.e. a dummy that has a value ‘1’ if there is 
a transatlantic pair and ‘0’ if this is not the case. The transatlantic dummy measures the 
increase in transatlantic trade and investment in case of a once percent decrease in the NTM 
index. For service sectors, the business survey did not yield sufficient numbers of responses 
and therefore the OECD FDI restrictiveness indicators have been used instead. 
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IV. From variable coefficient to transatlantic, EU and NAFTA trade cost equivalents (TCE) 
Step III yields – overall and sector level – regression coefficients for the EU dummies, NAFTA 
dummies and transatlantic dummies for trading block membership. These are variables with 
a bi-directional dimension (exporter and importer). The coefficients on the EU, NAFTA and 
transatlantic dummy variables can be changed into trade cost estimates as follows: 
 TCE = 100 𝑥 (𝑒𝜀 − 1) (4) 
where ε is the gravity regression coefficient. The TCE (in percent) is the estimated increase in 
trade costs as a consequence of NTMs (regulatory differences) in the EU, NAFTA and 
transatlantic market place. This information is presented in columns (C), (D) and (E) of Table 
2. 
V. From transatlantic, EU and NAFTA TCEs to sector specific TCEs 
Having calculated in Step IV the TCE values (%) for the intra-EU preference margins (EU 
dummy), intra-NAFTA preference margins (NAFTA dummy) and transatlantic offset margins 
(transatlantic dummy), it is possible to derive the total NTM effects for the EU and US of TTIP. 
For the EU the total NTM effect is the intra-EU preference margin minus the transatlantic offset 
margin. For the US, the total NTM effect of TTIP is the intra-NAFTA preference margin minus 
the same transatlantic offset margin. That is, it is assumed that the preferential intra-EU and 
intra-NAFTA treatment is extended across the Atlantic. This information is presented in 
columns (F) and (G) of Table 2. 
Final results 
The Berden et al. (2009) study reaches some interesting conclusions and yields specific insights. 
First of all, the study has been able to generate bi-directional, i.e. EU-US and US-EU, TCEs at 
sector level for 18 different sectors. Since agriculture was not in the scope of the study, no 
results have been reported for agriculture. Second, the study shows that there is significant 
NTM-level variation across sectors and depending on the direction of the trade flow. Third, 
combining the NTM approach with OECD FDI restrictiveness indexes, the study also finds 
NTM levels for service sectors. Fourth, because an NTM index is used, the study was able to 
employ a friction-variable approach5 to determine the effect of NTMs per se, staying away from 
the problem that residual approaches suffer from: measurement errors or omitted variables 
lead directly to errors in the estimated NTM levels. They find that NTMs matter more than 
tariffs in creating barriers to trade and that the level of restrictiveness varies significantly. 
                                                     
5 A friction-variable approach is one where the specific variable – in this case the ‘NTM index’ – is used 
as an independent variable on the right-hand side – and as such has a coefficient to be measured. The 
friction variable approach is set against the ‘residual’ approach, whereby it is assumed that the 
regression (with all its control variables) captures everything, except for the NTM effect which is the 
residual. This means that any effect not captured by the regression equation ends up in the residual – 
and as such in the level of NTMs. The residual approach is clearly considered inferior to the friction-
variable approach because of the risk of mis-estimation (especially over-estimation), which is why the 
latter approach has been chosen in Berden et al. (2009). 
10  BERDEN & FRANCOIS 
 
Table 2. From NTM values to trade cost equivalents for trade flows (Steps I to V) 



















effect EU to 
US (Step V) 
(F) 
Net NTM 
effect US to 
EU (Step V) 
(G) 
 EU to US US to EU EU to US US to EU    EU to US US to EU 
Aerospace & space 56.0 55.1 0.44 0.44 18.8 19.1 0.0 19.1 18.8 
Automotive 34.8 31.6 0.30 0.27 16.3 17.6 -9.2 26.8 25.5 
Chemicals 45.8 53.2 0.38 0.43 23.9 21.0 0.0 21.0 23.9 
Communication services 44.6 27.0 0.37 0.24    1.7 11.7 
Electronics 30.8 20.0 0.27 0.18   -6.5 6.5 6.5 
Cosmetics 48.3 52.2 0.39 0.42 34.6 32.4 0.0 32.4 34.6 
Financial services 29.7 21.3 0.26 0.19    31.7 11.3 
Insurance services 29.5 39.3 0.26 0.33    19.1 10.8 
Food & beverages 45.5 33.6 0.38 0.29 56.8 73.3 0.0 73.3 56.8 
OICE 37.9 32.3 0.32 0.28 8.9 12.7 -10.2 22.9 19.1 
Pharmaceuticals 23.8 44.7 0.21 0.37 24.0 18.2 8.7 9.5 15.3 
Transport services 39.9 17.6 0.34 0.16      
Biotechnology 46.1 50.2 0.38 0.41      
ICT 20.0 19.3 0.18 0.18    3.9 14.9 
Construction services 45.0 37.3 0.37 0.32    2.5 4.6 
Machinery 50.9 36.5 0.41 0.31      
Medical equipment 49.3 44.5 0.40 0.37      
Other business services 42.2 20.0 0.35 0.18    3.9 14.9 
Personal, recreational services 35.8 35.4 0.31 0.30    2.5 4.4 
Steel 35.5 24.0 0.30 0.22 11.9 17.0 0.0 17.0 11.9 
Textiles 35.6 48.9 0.30 0.40 11.0 8.5 -8.2 16.7 19.2 
Wood & paper products 30.0 47.1 0.26 0.39 11.3 7.7 0.0 7.7 11.3 
Travel services 35.6 17.6 0.30 0.16      
Total average 38.1 35.2 0.33 0.30 21.8 22.8 -2.3 17.7 17.5 
Source: Berden et al. (2009). 
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2.3 The Fontagné et al. (2013) NTM quantification methodology 
Fontagné et al. (2013) come up with estimates of NTMs for goods and services. For goods 
NTMs they base themselves on Kee et al. (2009) while for services they draw from Fontagné et 
al. (2011). In this section, we summarise the approaches by Kee et al. (2009) and Fontagné et 
al. (2011).   
I. Quantifying NTMs for goods – Kee et al. (2009) 
Kee et al. (2009) go through three steps: they define three types of restrictiveness indicators, 
they describe the approach to estimate ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs at tariff line 
level, which is equivalent to the trade restrictiveness indexes (TCEs).   
Tariff and NTM data 
The main sources Kee et al. (2009) use for tariff data come from the WTO’s Integrated Database 
and UNCTADs TRAINS. In addition, the MAcMap database is used for specific tariffs as well 
as for data on unilateral, bilateral and regional preferences. The main source for core NTM 
data (see below) is the UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. NTMs are price control measures, 
quantity restrictions, monopolistic measures and technical regulations. In addition, the 
authors use the WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews and the EU’s Standard’s Database (Shepherd, 
2004). The agricultural domestic support is obtained from the WTO members’ notifications 
(see Hoekman et al., 2004, for a discussion on this variable). 
TRI, OTRI and MA-OTRI restrictiveness indicators 
Kee et al. (2009) start by arguing that in order to measure TCEs properly, in line with Anderson 
& Neary (1992), two aggregation problems need to be addressed: the aggregation of different 
forms and types of trade policies and the aggregation across different goods that have different 
degrees of economic importance. Anderson & Neary (1994, 1996) find that “one single indicator 
cannot provide a measure of trade distortions a country imposes on itself while simultaneously 
capturing trade distortions imposed on its trading partners” (Kee et al., 2009, p. 173). In line with 
Anderson & Neary, Kee et al. define the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) – domestic welfare 
effect of domestic trade policies; the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) – effect of 
domestic trade policies on domestic imports; and the Market Access-Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI) – effect of domestic trade policies on domestic exports. 
AVE equivalents of NTMs at tariff line level and trade restrictiveness 
Kee et al.’s theoretical foundation comes from Leamer (1990) with an ‘n-good n-factor’ general 
equilibrium model. The import value of a good is regressed on exogenous world prices, tariff 
line dummies, country characteristics, economic size, a dummy for islands and a measure for 
distance to world markets as well as three variables that are the focus of the analysis: a dummy 
indicating the presence of a core NTM, a variable measuring the degree of agricultural 
domestic support, and ad valorem tariffs for that good. Various corrections are applied to this 
basic regression to correct for – for example – tariff endogeneity and lack of time variation. In 
its essence, Kee et al. (2009) estimate the impact of core NTMs and agricultural domestic 
support on imports at tariff line level. 
In order to make the estimated core NTM variable comparable to ad valorem tariffs, the 
quantity impact needs to be transformed into price-equivalents: 






The AVEs are calculated in each country at the tariff line level. The AVE is positive when the 
NTM is binding and ‘zero’ when the NTM is not binding. In Table 3 below, the main empirical 
results of Kee et al. (2009) for NTM TCEs are reported for the EU and US. 
II. Quantifying NTMs for services – Fontagné et al. (2011) 
In addition to the estimates for NTMs in goods by Kee et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013) base 
themselves on Fontagné et al. (2011) regarding services NTM estimates. They use a quantity-
based approach using gravity, while addressing specific services-related problems along the 
way. For example, in services – as opposed to goods – non-discriminatory market access is not 
influenced by the presence of tariffs but rather by NTMs, e.g. regulatory divergences. Also, 
measuring cross-border trade in services implies an analysis of only one of the four modes, 
mode 1.  
Services trade data 
Fontagné et al. (2011) use the GTAP database as the main source for services trade data, 
providing them with bilateral trade in services for 14 services sectors (in 2004): construction, 
communication, trade, finance, other services (education, health, defence, public services), 
business, transport (air, water, other), insurance, recreational services, dwelling, water, and 
energy – reducing this to seven sectors through some aggregations. The authors use IMF data 
on GDP and Producer Price Indexes and population data from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. For trade in services the authors use the OECD data because of 
better country coverage and annual frequency. This implies that they miss some countries but 
still 89% of all global services trade is covered. 
Tariff equivalents of NTMs for services 
It is regulatory differences, i.e. NTMs, that constitute barriers to trade in services. Because we 
cannot observe directly the individual regulations (in a quantity-based approach to 
quantifying NTMs), through gravity, Fontagné et al. (2011) compare actual trade with the 
theoretical situation of free trade in services without any trade costs associated. This yields a 
ratio that represents the deviation of actual imports of services of a country compared to its 
potential free trade imports. Because the free trade imports can also not be directly seen, 
Fontagné et al. (2011) define a benchmark country as the ‘free trader’ and calculate everything 
else compared to this benchmark. This allows Fontagné et al. (2011) to estimate the tariff 
equivalent – under the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution (something that is 
most likely not the case as is suggested by Francois et al., 2009). The TCEs that Fontagné et al. 
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Table 3. Country estimates NTM coefficients and NTM TCEs 
Country and Sector NTM TCEs EU (%) 
(A) 
NTM TCEs US (%) 
(B) 
Agriculture 48.2 51.3 
Manufacturing 42.8 32.3 
Services* 32.0 47.3 
- Communication 38.6 36.9 
- Construction 53.2 95.4 
- Financial services 51.2 51.3 
- Insurance services 44.9 43.7 
- Business services 32.6 42.3 
- Other services 39.1 8.8 
- Trade 48.0 61.5 
- Transport 29.1 17.5 
- Water 65.3 98.4 
* For services, we report the unweighted average of EU member states from Fontagné et al. (2011) as the EU 
results. 
Sources: Kee et al. (2009) and Fontagné et al. (2011). 
Final results 
The Fontagné et al. (2013) study reaches some interesting conclusions. First of all, they combine 
the import elasticity and TCE for goods estimates of Kee et al. (2009) with the services NTM 
estimates of Fontagné et al. (2011) to get NTM estimates across agriculture, industry and 
services. Second, the results from Kee et al. (2009) results are based on an elaborate dataset and 
they use different trade restrictiveness indicators. They find NTMs at tariff line level using an 
approach that comes close – but is not exactly equal – to a price-based approach.  
2.4 The Egger et al. (2015) NTM quantification methodology 
Egger et al. (2015 forthcoming) focus on the quantification of NTMs while taking into account 
the depth of free trade agreements (Dür et al., 2014). They then use the estimated TCEs of 
NTMs in a CGE model to look at the potential effects of TTIP. The focus of this section is on 
the first part of their work: estimating the TCEs of NTMs. Like the other authors, Egger et al. 
(2015) recognise that the challenge in quantifying the effects of deep agreements is that most 
of the elements under negotiation cannot be directly measured quantitatively, something that 
is possible with tariffs.6 Egger et al. (2015) go through two steps to get to TCEs: first, they 
estimate levels of NTMs through a gravity model using historical evidence from (depth of) 
FTAs and then they take those estimates to turn them into ad valorem TCEs.  
Three-step approach: 
I. FTA data 
II. Estimations of NTMs 
III. Calculating TCEs 
                                                     
6 Tariffs allow us to more easily measure the difference between domestic prices and the world price, 
deriving the price wedge that then can be analysed straightforwardly with existing models and 
methods.  
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I. FTA data 
In order to get estimates of NTMs, Egger et al. (2015) look at evidence from past FTAs. The EU 
has engaged for decades in reducing NTMs in its internal market project; many (bilateral) 
FTAs have been signed over the past decade and the depth of these FTAs has increased over 
time. Through the DESTA – Design of Trade Agreements – database, a solid measure for the 
depth of trade agreements has become available. The DESTA data is used as a variable in the 
gravity analysis of Step II. 
II. Estimations of NTMs 
Egger et al. (2015) specify a gravity equation, modelling bilateral trade flows as a function of 
country-specific fixed effects, bilateral control variables, e.g. geography, culture, history, a 
measure of political distance (polity),7 tariff margins by country-pair (within or outside FTAs). 
Egger & Larch (2011) have shown that the NTM effect of FTAs corresponds to the combined 
effect of FTAs conditional on tariffs and the depth of FTAs. This is important, because it means 
that the NTM effect of FTAs can be estimated as ‘beyond tariff reductions’. The gravity 
regressions are run for each sector separately for two reasons: first, to allow for trade 
elasticities to vary across sectors as evidenced by Broda & Weinstein (2006) and Egger et al. 
(2012); second, to allow NTMs to vary across sectors as was shown by Cadot & Malouche 
(2012) and Berden et al. (2009). 
In order to estimate the importance of NTMs, the authors include two variables: a dummy 
indicator for intra-EU relationships and an integer-value DESTA variable (ranging from 0 to 
7) that indicates the depth of non-EU FTAs based on Dür et al. (2014). Egger et al. (2015) 
estimate a separate parameter for EU membership because it allows them to single out the EU 
internal market effects compared to other FTAs – since EU membership and the EU internal 
market clearly go beyond liberalisation policies in other FTAs. The results of this gravity 
estimation are presented below in Table 4 for goods (Columns (A) and (B)) and in Table 5 for 
services.  
For NTMs in services – as already alluded to in the previous section by Fontagné et al. (2013) 
–  various other issues matter (see also Francois & Hoekman, 2010, for a general discussion). 
Egger et al. (2015) do not estimate these NTMs themselves but rather work with estimates of 
trade restrictions in services from the World Bank (Borchert et al., 2014), AVEs for trade 
barriers in services based on the World Bank data (Jafari & Tarr, 2015), and assessments of 
GATS bindings and how these compare to PTA services commitments from the WTO (Roy, 
2011 database, updated 2013).  
III. Calculating TCEs 
The estimates obtained under Step II for the coefficients for FTA depth (DESTA) and the EU 
membership dummy are taken by Egger et al. (2014) to derive potential changes in ad valorem 
trade costs along the same lines as Berden et al. (2009):  
 TCE = 100 𝑥 (𝑒𝜀 − 1) (6) 
                                                     
7 Egger et al. (2015) also include a measure of political distance based on measures from the political 
science literature. They use the Quality of Governance expert survey dataset (Teorell et al., 2011), in 
particular the pairwise similarity of polity, reflecting evidence that homophily is important in 
explaining direct (economic and) political linkages (De Benedictis & Tajoli, 2011). 
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The results of the TCE equivalents for goods are presented below in Table 4 and for services 
in Table 5. Both in Columns (C) and (D) NTM TCE values are reported. Column (C) shows the 
results when the gravity regression is run with the EU dummy as a benchmark, i.e. the NTM 
effect compared to the EU because it is the deepest FTA we know of today. Column (D) shows 
the NTM TCE estimates when the gravity regression is run with the DESTA variable (for depth 
of FTAs), comparing the existing NTMs to an average depth of an FTA as the benchmark.  
Table 4. Gravity results and TCE equivalents (%) for goods (EU membership and FTA depth) 
Sector Gravity 














Goods 0.575 0.087 12.9 13.7 
Primary food 1.610 0.150 25.2 15.8 
Energy -0.001 0.169 -0.01 16.1 
Processed food 1.499 0.158 48.4 33.8 
Beverages & tobacco 1.498 0.215 41.8 42.0 
Petrochemicals 0.270 0.173 7.9 24.2 
Chemicals & pharma 0.889 0.110 20.6 29.1 
Metals 1.268 0.086 38.5 16.7 
Motor vehicles 1.299 0.184 19.5 19.3 
Electrical machinery 0.631 0.009 19.4 1.8 
Other machinery 0.133 0.071 1.6 6.2 
Other goods 0.468 0.043 5.7 3.6 
Source: Egger et al. (2015). 
Table 5. Gravity results and TCE equivalents (%) for goods (EU membership and FTA depth) 
Services AVEs of current policies (%) 
 EU US 
Services 12.8 12.9 
Construction*   
Air transport 25.0 11.0 
Maritime transport 1.7 13.0 
Other transport 29.7 0.0 
Distribution 1.4 0.0 
Communications  1.1 3.5 
Banking 1.5 17.0 
Insurance 6.6 17.0 
Professional and business  35.4 42.0 
Personal, recreational   
Public services   
* Construction is taken from Berden et al. (2009). 
Source: Egger et al. (2015). 
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Final results 
Egger et al. (2015) employ a new approach to estimating the height of NTMs through a 
quantity-based approach framework. For goods, they do not employ detailed NTM data – 
either from existing databases or a business survey – but they look at (the depths of) past FTAs, 
with the EU Internal Market project singled out in particular and use the evidence from the 
past to look at NTM potential. For services, they build on the work done by Borchert et al. 
(2014) on trade restrictions in services and Jafari & Tarr (2015) on ad valorem tariff equivalents 
for trade barriers in services. They find that NTMs pose significant trade restrictions, but more 
in goods than in services. This could be explained in part by the fact that for services, only 
modes 1 and 2 and to an indirect extent mode 3 are captured, and that services have a much 
larger non-tradable share. They also find that compared to the EU benchmark this effect is (on 
average) larger than compared to the FTA depth. This is the case because the EU dummy 
captures the deepest FTA there is, while the FTA depth is an average of the depth of the FTAs 
(which is less deep than the EU post-WWII project). 
3. Analysing and summarising the results 
“Give me a one-handed economist”, US President Harry Truman told the press, frustrated by 
his economic advisors who kept on saying “on the one hand … on the other hand …” Reading 
this paper thus far, you may have similar feelings. Indeed, there are many differences between 
the studies carried out, but let’s start out this section with some important similarities across 
the studies, followed by the differences. 
3.1 A systematic comparison of empirical studies 
Similarities in approaches 
The first important similarity is the fact that all the studies – although to slightly differing 
degrees – find that TCEs of NTMs are significant and of a higher order of magnitude than tariff 
barriers today. The second important similarity is that those studies that could look at a more 
disaggregate level find that the variation of TCEs across sectors is significant: trade barriers 
and regulatory divergences differ significantly across sectors. The third important similarity 
is that they all agree that summarising NTMs in terms of TCEs or tariff equivalents is the best 
way to incorporate the multi-dimensional and complex issue of regulatory cooperation into a 
manageable variable to work with further, at least at the moment. In other words, the approach 
is certainly not ideal, but is the best we have given the state of the art in terms of data 
availability and applicable methodologies. This caveat is an important one. We can expect 
improvements as better data and methods become available. 
Differences in approaches 
As highlighted in the chapter so far, there are many different ways to approach the issue of 
quantifying regulatory cooperation/NTMs. In order to structure these differences, we 
categorise them into the following components, which we then use to compare the studies in 
Table 6 below: basic approach to quantifying NTMs: quantity- or price-based; data sources to 
start measuring NTMs; econometric specifications; level of disaggregation and coverage of 
service sector NTMs.  
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Basic approach to quantifying NTMs: quantity- or price-based approaches – row (A) in Table 6 
In line with the two main strands in the literature one of the differences between the recent 
studies is that one uses the price-based approach (Dean et al., 2009), which means they use 
detailed price data to estimate the impact of core NTMs on prices and assess their significance. 
From there they can estimate TCEs of the NTMs. The other authors use the quantity-based 
approaches (Berden et al., 2009; Fontagné et al., 2013; Egger et al., 2015). They use gravity 
equations to estimate by how much the presence of an NTM reduces trade flows compared to 
potential trade. This then allows for the estimation of a tariff equivalent or TCE. 
Data sources to start measuring NTMs – row (B) in Table 6 
The most pronounced difference between the covered approaches is the set of input data used 
(in combination with the econometrics). Dean et al. (2009) focus on detailed price data to create 
the dependent variable – the price gap. They have price data for 47 products which they can 
aggregate into four agricultural sub-sectors. The authors also employ the UNCTAD TRAINS 
and USITC databases for NTM incidence – to measure the share of NTMs in explaining this 
gap. They use both datasets combined because – though they overlap in part – they also 
contain distinct information and are partially complementary. Berden et al. (2009) conducted 
a large business survey with 5,500 responses to create a bilateral import-export NTM index 
that – together with data from GTAP (2007) – was inserted into a gravity equation to estimate 
the statistical and economic significance of NTMs for the dependent variable, trade and 
investments in goods. For services – as the business survey responses were too few, they used 
the OECD FDI restrictiveness indicators. The survey also yielded information on specific 
barriers, how important they were according to firms and an assessment of whether the 
individual barriers would affect costs or economic rent (or a combination of both).  Fontagné 
et al. (2013) base themselves on Fontagné et al. (2011) for services NTM estimates – using the 
GTAP database (2004) – and on Kee et al. (2009) for goods NTM estimates – who use the 
UNCTAD TRAINS database for NTM information supplemented by MAcMaps and WTO 
Trade Policy Reviews as well as WTO notifications. Finally, Egger et al. (2015) use a 
combination of GTAP (2011) data and data from past FTAs – by means of an EU dummy and 
the DESTA variable to measure the depth of FTAs. DESTA have a value between 0 and 7 
whereby 7 is the deepest form of a trade agreement. Recently, trade agreements have increased 
in depth. 
Econometric specifications – row (C) in Table 6 
The detailed econometric specifications differ between the studies. Most distinct is the 
approach by Dean et al. (2009) since they carry out a regression analysis with retail price gaps 
as the dependent variable and tariffs and NTMs – adjusted for differences in local distribution 
mark-ups, transport costs and specific tariffs. The other three studies all use the gravity 
equation and the same dependent variable – but the gravity equations are not specified in the 
same way. In Berden et al. (2009) the gravity equation contains the NTM index on the right-
hand side, allowing the authors to measure the contribution of NTMs to the trade gap (and 
thus indirectly the price gap). Egger et al. (2015) employ the gravity equation with an EU 
dummy and the DESTA variable for depth of FTAs on the right-hand side as two independent 
variables. They also add a variable called ‘polity’ to correct for political distance. Finally, 
Fontagné et al. (2013) – using Kee et al. (2009) for goods NTM estimation – use the gravity 
equation but run it per sector, employing a partial equilibrium and not a general equilibrium 
approach. For services, they rely on Fontagné et al. (2011), whereby a gravity equation is used. 
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Level of sector disaggregation – row (D) in Table 6 
The level of disaggregation differs across the studies. Dean et al. (2009) focus on four 
agricultural sub-sectors – at a high degree of disaggregation, but for only a small part of the 
economy. It is clear that the large amount of data needed for the price-based approach limits 
the scope in terms of the number of sectors that can be studied. Fontagné et al. (2013) explore 
a limited number of goods sectors, but a comparable number of service sectors to Berden et al. 
(2009) and Egger et al. (2015). In terms of goods sector disaggregation Berden et al. (2009) and 
Egger et al. (2015) use the GTAP database (2007 and 2011) to reach the highest level of 
disaggregation covering the entire economy. 
Coverage of service sectors – row (E) in Table 6 
Dean et al. (2009), using detailed price data, focus on four agricultural sectors but do not look 
at service sectors. Berden et al. (2009), using the business survey, cover nine service sectors 
that are also in GTAP (2007). Fontagné et al. (2013) cover the same nine service sectors but use 
the GTAP (2004) database. Finally, Egger et al. (2015) use the broadest service sector coverage 
available in GTAP (2011), looking at NTMs in 11 sectors. 
Country coverage – row (F) in Table 6 
The three GTAP-based studies (Fontagné et al., 2013; Berden et al., 2009; and Egger et al., 2015) 
cover the entire world economically, but aggregate countries into relevant groups. Berden et 
al. (2009), focusing on TTIP, aggregate all GTAP countries into the EU, US and Rest of World 
(ROW). Egger et al. (2015) – also focusing on TTIP – define the EU, US, EFTA, Turkey, Other 
Europe, Mediterranean, Japan, China, TPP countries, Other Asia, Other middle-income, and 
low-income countries. Fontagné et al. (2013) specify 78 countries for goods trade and 65 for 
services trade. Finally, Dean et al. (2009) cover 60 countries. 
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Table 6. Structured comparison of different approaches to quantifying NTMs 
Components Dean et al. (2009) Berden et al. (2009) Fontagné et al. (2013) Egger et al. (2015) 
Basis approach to quantifying 
NTMs (A) 
Price-based approach Quantity-based approach Quantity-based approach Quantity-based approach 
Data sources to start 
measuring NTMs (B) 
UNCTAD TRAINS and USITC 
for NTM incidence + retail 
price data for 47 products EIU 
City data 2001 
Business survey (5,500 
responses), OECD FDI 
restrictiveness indicators, 
GTAP 2007 pre-release 
UNCTAD TRAINS, 
MAcMaps, WTO TPR, WTO 
member notifications, GTAP 
2004 
EU dummy and FTA depth 
dummy (past FTA results); 
GTAP 2011 
Econometric specifications (C) Regression analysis with retail 
price gap as dependent 
variable and tariffs and NTMs 
(and other control variables) 
as independent variables 
Friction variable gravity 
analysis with goods & services 
trade (and investment) as 
dependent variable and NTMs 
(and control variables) as 
independent variables 
For goods NTMs estimation 
use the gravity equation but 
run it per sector – employing a 
partial equilibrium and not a 
general equilibrium approach. 
For services NTMs a gravity 
equation is used 
Gravity analysis with goods & 
services trade as dependent 
variable and EU/FTA depth 
variables (and control 
variables) as independent 
variables 
Level of disaggregation (D) Fruits & vegetables, bovine 
meat, processed food, apparel 
Aerospace & space, 
automotive, chemicals, 
communication, electronics, 
cosmetics, financial, insurance, 




medical equipment, other 
business services, personal & 
recreational, steel, textiles, 
wood & paper, travel  
Agriculture, manufacturing, 
services – communication, 
construction, financial, 
insurance, business, other 
services, trade, transport, 
water 
Overall goods, primary food, 
energy, processed food, 
beverages & tobacco, 
petrochemicals, chemicals & 
pharma, metals, motor 
vehicles, electrical machinery, 
other machinery, other goods, 
overall services, air transport, 
maritime transport, other 
transport, distribution, 
communications, banking, 
insurance, professional and 
business services, personal, 
recreational, public services 
Coverage of services sectors 
(E) 
No Yes, 9 sectors Yes, 9 sectors Yes, 11 sectors 
Country coverage (F) 60 countries EU, US and other countries 
combined into ROW 
Goods: 78 countries 
Services: 65 countries  
12 regions 
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Strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches 
Each of the covered approaches has its merits and challenges. And in light of the complex 
discussion of how to quantify NTMs it is important to at least summarise some of the main 
strengths and weaknesses of each of the approaches in order to aid policy-makers in deciding 
what model they deem best-suited to the policy questions at hand. In Table 7 below, we 
present a short summary of the main strengths and weaknesses per approach.  
Table 7. Summary of main strengths and weaknesses of NTM quantification approaches 
Study Strengths Weaknesses 
Dean et al. 
(2009) 
 The direct estimation of the 
contribution of NTMs on the price gap  
 The direct link at product level (if price 
data available) to NTMs that could 
explain the price gap 
 The treatment of NTMs as endogenous 
and in combination with tariffs and 
income (through interaction terms) 
 The careful assessment of both the 
UNCTAD TRAINS database and 
USITC database and combining the 
(partially complementary) information 
available in each of these datasets 
 The large amounts of price data 
needed for all products affected by 
large-scale FTA effects is not available 
– so not suitable to large-scale FTA 
policy questions 
 NTM incidence is needed to 
distinguish NTMs from other factors 
that influence the price gap – how to 
measure the presence of NTMs? 
 Some of the TCEs attributed to NTMs 
could represent price premia because 
of product differentiation, not 
because of the existence of NTMs 
Berden 
et al. (2009) 
 The use of a business survey that leads 
to the construction of an NTM index 
(values 0-100) that allows for a friction 
variable gravity regression approach 
 The combination of business survey 
and OECD FDI restrictiveness indexes 
to yield bi-directional and sector-
specific NTM estimates 
 The characterisation of NTMs into cost 
and/or economic rent inducing – very 
important for estimating welfare 
impacts of NTMs 
 Information on actual barriers faced 
while exporting to the EU/US by small 
and large firms 
 Indirect estimation of the price gap: 
first the quantity gap, then with price 
elasticities the price gap – adding risk 
of the quality of the estimation 
 The explained trade gap cannot be 
directly linked to NTMs at product 
level 
 The risk of a biased business survey 
(checked econometrically and no bias 
found) 
 The concept of ‘actionability’ in order 
to divide NTMs into those that can 
potentially be addressed and those 
that cannot/are not likely to be 
addressed limits the potential of 
regulatory cooperation, but is 
empirical only 
Fontagné 
et al. (2013) 
 The estimation work of Kee et al. is 
grounded in theory (Anderson & 
Neary) 
 The method of Kee et al. allows for 
estimation of bootstrap standard errors 
for the TCEs that take into account 
sampling and estimation errors 
 Indirect estimation of the price gap: 
first the quantity gap, then with price 
elasticities the price gap – adding risk 
of the quality of the estimation 
 In addition to the above, any mis-
estimation of transport costs also 
affects the NTM impact (Dean et al.); 
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Study Strengths Weaknesses 
(indicating whether the quality of the 
estimation is a risk) 
 Kee et al. use very detailed NTM 
incidence data at tariff line level using 
detailed import elasticities – coming 
closer to product-level barriers 
 The explained trade gap cannot be 
directly linked to NTMs at product 
level (even though Kee et al. are close) 
 The partial equilibrium approach 
chosen by Kee et al. may lead to a bias 
(overestimation) of NTMs – direct 
impact, no income effects and no 
substitution effects possible 
 Kee et al. depend on ability of 
Heckscher-Ohlin model specification 
to explain trade flows 
Egger et al. 
(2015) 
 The approach to estimate potential 
NTMs based on a very large amount of 
information from past FTAs 
 The use of DESTA as a variable in the 
gravity equation to insert a measure of 
the depth of FTAs 
 The careful treatment of political 
variables (‘polity’) and sensitivity 
analysis to take the Berden et al. 
concept of actionability to a new 
(tested) level 
 Indirect estimation of the price gap: 
first the quantity gap, then with price 
elasticities the price gap – adding risk 
of the quality of the estimation 
 The explained trade gap cannot be 
directly linked to NTMs at product 
level 
 
3.2 Juxtaposing the four approaches 
Comparison of study results, policy recommendations and relevance for TTIP 
negotiations 
The four studies covered in detail in this chapter have been used to various degrees to look at 
the potential effects of TTIP. It is important to note that in order to measure the potential effects 
of TTIP, quantifying the level of NTMs is only one – and the first – methodological step. In 
order to come up with economic estimates of a potential TTIP agreement, four methodological 
steps need to be taken: 
1) Quantification of NTMs as explained in this chapter 
2) Combining the quantified NTM estimates with tariff line information 
3) Developing liberalisation scenarios that could be the result of the TTIP negotiations 
4) Employing a macro/trade model (partial or general equilibrium) to look at the macro-
economic effects 
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Figure 1. NTM quantification work used in different TTIP impact studies 
 
Link between NTM quantification and TTIP impact studies 
Many studies have in recent years worked through these four steps in order to quantify the 
potential effects of TTIP. And these studies have shown different results of a potential TTIP 
agreement because of different choices made in any of these four steps: different estimations 
of NTMs (the topic of this chapter), different tariff line data depending on what year the study 
was carried out, different liberalisation scenarios, i.e. anticipated levels of ambition, and 
different macro/international trade models to look at the final welfare effects. In Figure 1 
above, we show what NTM estimation work has been used in some of the main studies carried 
out to estimate the potential impact of TTIP. 
Comparison of NTM estimation results and link to policy-making 
In Table 8 we present the summary of estimated NTM results per study and per sector (or 
aggregate thereof). This is in essence a meta-results table for the most important NTM 
estimates carried out so far, focusing on the EU and US from the TTIP perspective. From this 
table some interesting conclusions can be drawn.  
First of all, it becomes clear from all studies that NTMs matter significantly in terms of how 
they affect international trade. The studies confirm that NTMs matter more than tariffs (2.2% 
for US and 3.3% for EU on average, according to Fontagné et al., 2013). This result matters for 
policy-makers because it suggests they should focus their attention relatively more on 
regulatory cooperation than on tariffs when negotiating new free trade agreements, as that is 
the area where potential barriers are highest. In fact, the Egger et al. (2015) study presents 
evidence that this is indeed what policy-makers are doing in recent trade agreements – 
stemming from the fact that the depth of FTAs negotiated and under negotiation has increased 
significantly in recent years. 
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Second, when we look across sectors, there appears to be a significant degree of variation 
between NTMs at sector level and depending on the direction of EU-US trade. For example, 
in processed foods, the NTMs found are much higher than in electrical machinery (electronics), 
and in general manufacturing goods NTMs are found to be higher than services NTMs (with 
the exception of Fontagné et al., 2013). This result implies that policy-makers should drill down 
into NTMs at sector level. They could focus first on those sectors where the differences are 
significant (and thus the scope for reduction is larger) based on as broad a range of studies as 
possible.  
Third, in some sectors the studies show strikingly similar results. For example, when 
comparing the results of both the price-based and quantity-based approaches for processed 
foods, we find that the results are quite comparable across all studies. Furthermore, in some 
sectors like agriculture, automotive, steel, textiles, and insurance services – though level 
estimates vary – all studies find significant levels of NTMs. Finally, when comparing estimated 
service sector NTM levels – though the height of NTMs differs – all studies that looked at 
services NTMs find that financial services, insurance services and maritime transport services 
are much more restrictive in the US than in the EU. Policy-makers can take note of the reported 
sectors and trends found across the studies as cross-validated, and treat them as ‘more likely 
to be accurate’ (as compared to those sectors or results where divergences in findings are high 
– see next point).  
Fourth, the studies show some important differences in results. Dean et al. (2009) and Fontagné 
et al. (2013) find on average much higher levels of barriers from NTMs than Berden et al. (2009) 
and Egger et al. (2015). It is not easy to compare the studies because they use different levels 
of sector aggregations, e.g. Fontagné et al. (2013), only use report aggregate manufacturing 
results, not sector-specific ones. However, when we make an attempt to analyse where the 
differences in results come from, we find that the answer lies in part in what sectors are 
estimated and in part in what data and methodological approaches are used.  
 First, when turning to what sectors have been estimated, we note that Berden et al. (2009) 
do not include estimations on the agricultural sector. Dean et al. (2009) and Fontagné et al. 
(2013) find high agricultural barriers – which explains in part why on average for all sectors 
the Berden et al. (2009) study finds lower NTMs, i.e. agricultural barriers are not included. 
So if policy-makers want to focus on the NTM levels in agriculture, they should turn to 
one of the other three studies. 
 Second, we find that Dean et al. (2009) and Fontagné et al. (2013) – based on Kee et al. 
(2013) for manufacturing sectors – both use the UNCTAD TRAINS database, which collects 
NTMs and gives them a value ‘1’ if present and ‘0’ if absent. Berden et al. (2009) rely on the 
business survey results while Egger et al. (2015) use past FTAs as the benchmark (EU and 
FTA depth) – which do not have a binary nature. We believe that an important driver of 
the results is the binary nature of the NTMs in the UNCTAD TRAINS database versus the 
scaled variables of the Berden et al. business survey and FTA depth variable in Egger et al. 
Because the presence of any NTM is given a value ‘1’ it is possible to overestimate NTMs 
using UNCTAD TRAINS. There are large data limitations to measure the incidence, 
impact, nature and importance of NTMs. All approaches are approximations that could 
help policy-makers focus on ‘the biggest bang for the buck’ – especially if the studies cross-
validate each other’s results. 
 Third, it is important to note that Kee et al. (2009) themselves indicated that – as already 
outlined by Anderson (1998) – employing a partial equilibrium assumption on the 
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estimation approach “may lead to overestimating the degree of trade restrictiveness as the 
potential for substitution across markets is frozen in our setup…” (Kee et al., 2009, p. 196). Since 
Fontagné et al. (2013) take the results for NTM estimations in goods from Kee, this 
estimation bias may also be present in their work. For policy-makers it is therefore 
important to realise that the Fontagné et al. (2013) results could be biased upwards. 
 Fourth, Dean et al. (2009) use the price-based approach where they directly estimate the 
price gap and estimate the share of the price gap that can be attributed to NTMs, corrected 
for various factors. They however acknowledge that any measurement error in any of the 
control variables, e.g. transport costs, could lead to mismeasurement of the NTM variable 
(Q) as the residual variable that is measured. This implies that if any control variable is 
under-valued or if there is any effect that is not captured by the control variables, the 
potential NTM effect increases, thus possibly overestimating the impact of NTMs. For 
policy-makers it is therefore important to realise that the Fontagné et al. (2013) results 
could be biased upwards. 
 Fifth, especially in services, the differences in NTM estimates between Berden et al. and 
Egger et al. on the one hand and Fontagné et al. on the other are large. This cannot be 
attributed to the GTAP database, because both Berden and Fontagné use the same GTAP 
2007 version. Instead, we believe the different estimation results stem from the fact that 
Kee et al. (2009) use a partial equilibrium approach to estimating NTMs, taken 
subsequently by Fontagné, combined with the use of the UNCTAD TRAINS dummy 
variable. For policy-makers, this means that NTMs are high, but maybe not as high as 
presented by Fontagné. 
 
Finally, the price-based approaches require very large amounts of data at product level to 
work. If policy-makers are looking to estimate NTMs for specific products, and if price data 
are available in sufficient quantities, then the price-based approach is a very useful one to use. 
However, for estimating the impact of – for example – TTIP requires measuring the impact on 
tens of thousands of products in many sectors. For such an exercise price data are not available. 
Hence, using price-based approaches for all encompassing trade agreement impacts is not 
recommended. 
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Table 8. Summary of NTM quantification results per study 
Sector NTM TCE estimates 
by Dean et al. (2009) 
NTM TCE estimates 
by Berden et al. (2009) 
NTM TCE estimates 
by Fontagné et al. 
(2013)  
NTM TCE estimates 




NTM TCE estimates 




 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) 
 EU US EU to US US to EU EU US EU US EU US 
All goods       12.9 12.9 13.7 13.7 
Agriculture     48.2 51.3 25.2 25.2 15.8 15.8 
 - Bovine meat 68.2 80.0          
 - Fruits & vegetables 48.2 60.6         
Manufacturing     42.8 32.3     
- Aerospace & space   19.1 18.8       
- Automotive   26.8 25.5   19.5 19.5 19.3 19.3 
- Beverages & tobacco       41.8 41.8 42.0 42.0 
- Biotechnology           
- Chemicals   21.0 23.9   20.6 20.6 29.1 29.1 
- Cosmetics   32.4 34.6       
- Electronics (electrical machinery)   6.5 6.5   19.4 19.4 1.8 1.8 
- Energy       -0.01 -0.01 16.1 16.1 
- Machinery       1.6 1.6 6.2 6.2 
- Medical equipment           
- Office, Info & Comm, equip.   22.9 19.1       
- Other goods       5.7 5.7 3.6 3.6 
- Petrochemicals       7.9 7.9 24.2 24.2 
- Pharmaceuticals   9.5 15.3   20.6 20.6 29.1 29.1 
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Sector NTM TCE estimates 
by Dean et al. (2009) 
NTM TCE estimates 
by Berden et al. (2009) 
NTM TCE estimates 
by Fontagné et al. 
(2013)  
NTM TCE estimates 




NTM TCE estimates 




 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) 
 EU US EU to US US to EU EU US EU US EU US 
- Processed food 35.6 34.6 73.3 56.8   48.4 48.4 33.8 33.8 
- Steel (metals)   17.0 11.9   38.5 38.5 16.7 16.7 
- Textiles 46.3 22.6 16.7 19.2       
- Wood & paper products   7.7 11.3       
Services   8.5 8.9 32.0 47.3 12.8 12.9 12.8 12.9 
- Air transport services       25.0 11.0 25.0 11.0 
- Communication services   1.7 11.7 38.6 36.9 1.1 3.5 1.1 3.5 
- Construction services   2.5 4.6 53.2 95.4 4.6 2.5 4.6 2.5 
- Distribution       1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 
- Financial services (banking)   31.7 11.3 51.2 51.3 1.5 17.0 1.5 17.0 
- ICT   3.9 14.9       
- Insurance services   19.1 10.8 44.9 43.7 6.6 17.0 6.6 17.0 
- Maritime transport services     65.3 98.4 1.7 13.0 1.7 13.0 
- Other business services   3.9 14.9 32.6 42.3 35.4 42.0 35.4 42.0 
- Other transport services       29.7 0.0 29.7 0.0 
- Pers., recreational services   2.5 4.4       
- Trade     48.0 61.5     
- Transport services     29.1 17.5     
- Travel services           
Total average 49.6 49.5 17.7 17.5 41.0 42.2 17.0 18.7 16.4 18.1 
Sources: Dean et al. (2009), Berden et al. (2009), Kee et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2011) and Egger et al. (2015). 
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